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In the introductory sections of The Foundations of Arithmetic Frege claims 
that his aim in this book is to determine whether the concept "number" is 
definable. He believes that an answer to this question will assist him in 
determining the nature of the laws of arithmetic, specifically, whether they 
are analytic or a posteriori.1 Michael Dummett expresses concern with 
some of the conclusions Frege reaches in the Grundlagen in Frege: 
Philosophy of Mathematics, his recent study of Frege's contribution to the 
foundations of arithmetic. 
Noteworthy is Dummett's claim that "§56 may be stigmatized as the 
weakest in the whole Grundlagen."2 In this paper I will argue that 
Dummett has misread Frege's intentions in this and the surrounding sections 
of the Grundlagen. Specifically, Dummett treats these sections as an 
argument—a poor one at that—against the so-called adjectival strategy for 
explaining number statements. These sections, I will argue, are concerned 
with proving that numbers must be objects. Thus, Frege appeals to the 
definitions which Dummett identifies with the adjectival strategy merely for 
rhetorical purposes. He is not trying to show that the adjectival strategy is 
untenable, but rather, he wants to show what adequate definitions of 
numbers must be like. 
I will begin with an explanation of what Dummett takes Frege's 
intentions to be in §56. Then, I will explain how, according to Dummett, 
Frege fails to accomplish what he intended to accomplish. I will then 
propose an alternative reading of this section of the Grundlagen. Finally, I 
will discuss the relevance of Dummett's criticisms to the alternative reading. 
SECTION I Frege 's Intentions 
In this section I will explain what Dummett thinks Frege's intentions are in 
§56. This will involve an explanation of what Dummett calls the adjectival 
strategy for explaining number statements. I will also explain what 
Dummett believes Frege must do in order to accomplish all he intends to 
accomplish. 
1 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1980, page 5. 
2 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991, page 105. All references to Dummett are to this book. 
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Dummelt first tells us that Frege's intention in §56 is to reject the 
definitions that he has provided in the previous section. (101) Dummett 
treats §56 as part of a series of sections addressing a single problem. 
In §56-61 Frege is attempting to establish that arithmetical 
statements containing numerals must be taken at face-value and 
hence that the radical adjectival strategy is not feasible. 
Ontologically expressed, he is trying to establish that numbers 
must be regarded as objects. (101) 
Thus, as Dummett construes things, the definitions in §55 are definitions 
that are compatible with the adjectival strategy. 
What then is the adjectival strategy for explaining number statements? 
According to Dummett, the adjectival strategy is one of two possible 
strategies for explaining how "to make explicit the content both of 
ascriptions of numbers and of the propositions encountered in number 
theory". (99) And, when using the adjectival strategy we "first explain the 
adjectival use of number-words, and then explain the corresponding 
numerical terms by reference to it". (99) As Dummett explains, 
a radical version of the adjectival strategy would be to refuse to 
take numerical terms at face-value. According to this strategy, 
equations and other arithmetical statements in which numerals 
apparently figure as singular terms are to be explained ... by 
transforming them into sentences in which number-words occur 
only adjectivally. (99) 
This strategy, Dummett claims, is to be distinguished from what he calls the 
substantival strategy. According to this latter strategy wc "explain the use 
of numerals as singular terms, and then explain the corresponding number-
adjectives by reference to it". (99) The substantival view commits us to the 
thesis that numbers arc objects. 
Having set out Frege's project in §56 and surrounding sections, 
Dummett then proceeds to specify what Frege must do in order to 
accomplish all he aims to accomplish. According to Dummett, in order to 
prove that numbers are objects, Frege must "convict the definitions he 
proposed in §55 of being logically amiss". (102) 
Thus, as Dummett construes things, Frege's intention in §56 is to show 
that the definitions provided in the previous section are unacceptable. This, 
in turn, will show that the adjectival view of numbers is unacceptable, and 
thus that numbers are in fact objects. 
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SECTION II Dummett's Problems With §56 
In this section I will explain what Dummett takes to be the central problems 
with Frege's presentation in §56. Dummett identifies four problems. 
First, Dummett accuses Frege of begging the question. That is, given 
that Frege intends to show that number statements cannot be adequately 
accounted for with the resources available in the adjectival strategy, and 
consequently, that numbers are objects, it would beg the question if Frege 
rejected the definitions provided in §55 on grounds that presuppose that 
numbers are objects. But, according to Dummett, this is exactly what Frege 
does. 3 
To understand Dummett's second criticism some background is 
required. In §55 Frege presents three definitions, a definition of 0, a 
definition of 1, and a definition of the successor function. Dummett's 
concern is that the criticisms Frege raises against these definitions in §56 
really only address the third definition, the definition of the successor 
function. Consequently, as far as Dummett is concerned, Frege has not 
adequately shown that the adjectivalist's definitions for 0 and 1 are 
unacceptable. (102) Dummett does grant that the definition for "there are 
just (n + 1) ..." is unacceptable, but he claims that Frege "had no case 
against those of "there are 0.. ." and "there is just 1 ( 1 0 5 ) 
The third problem that Dummett has with §56 is that Frege treats the 
adjectival view as a disguised version of the substantival view. (109) 
Hence, rather than showing that the adjectival view is inadequate, Dummett 
suggests that Frege has misrepresented the adjectival view.4 
Dummett's final criticism of § 56 is that Frege fails to prove that 
numbers are in fact objects. (105) Consequently, according to Dummett, 
Frege "has in no way shown the adjectival strategy impossible, as he is 
purporting to have done". (109) In fact, Dummett argues that 
contrary to the impression [Frege] contrives to convey in §§56-
57, the radical strategy can be pursued for a considerable 
distance: the definitions Frege actually gives in §§71-83 can 
readily be mimicked in the adjectival mode. (131) 
3 See pages 102 and 106. Dummett states this most clearly in the passage on page 
106. According to Dummett, the second criticism that Frege raises in §56 against 
the definitions proposed by the adjectival strategy is with respect to their inability to 
account for the identity of a number with itself over time. But, according to 
Dummett, "identity, as Frege understood it, is a relation between objects: the 
complaint [that Frege raises] therefore assumes what has yet to be proved, that 
numbers are objects", (emphasis is mine) 
4 I felt it was important to distinguish this criticism from the first. After all, one 
could beg the question without misrepresenting the view one is criticizing, or 
similarly one could misrepresent the view one is criticizing without raising 
criticisms that beg the question. 
REINTERPRETING § 56 79 
These are the criticisms underlying Dummett 's claim regarding the 
weakness of §56. 
SECTION III An Alternative Reading 
In this section, I would like to present and defend an alternative reading of 
§56 of the Grundlagen. On the interpretation that I will be defending, Frege 
is not trying to show that the adjectival strategy cannot make sense of our 
use of number statements, as Dummett suggests, but rather, his intention is 
to show that only the substantival strategy can provide us with adequate 
definitions of numbers. And it is because of this that Frege concludes that 
numbers must be objects. 
Let us begin by considering Frege's description of sections 55-61 in his 
"Analysis of Contents". These sections are grouped under the heading: 
"Every individual number is a self-subsistent object". These sections 
address three distinct projects. First, in §55 Frege presents three 
definitions—Dummett refers to these as the definitions of the adjectival 
strategy. Second, sections 56 and 57 provide a discussion of the three 
definitions presented in §55. In the first of these sections Frege argues that 
"the attempted definitions... define a predicate in which the number is only 
an element." 5 And in the latter section, Frege claims to be showing that "a 
statement of number should be regarded as an identity between numbers." 6 
Finally, in sections 58 to 61 Frege addresses two objections that he 
anticipates to his thesis that numbers are self-subsistent objects. 
Clearly, if Frege is addressing objections to his thesis from section 58 
onward, he must be assuming that he has already advanced the thesis that 
numbers are objects in the preceding sections. I believe that he has, to his 
satisfaction. In fact, as I will argue in the remainder of this section, I 
believe that §56 is intended to show the necessity of this thesis. 
In §56 Frege raises two difficulties with the definitions proposed in the 
previous section. They are as follows: (1) the definitions do not enable us to 
distinguish numbers from non-numbers, for example, they do not allow us 
to determine whether Julius Caesar is a number or not; and, (2) the 
definitions do not enable us to identify a number with itself over time. 
These difficulties, Frege believes, are the sorts of difficulties that adequate 
definitions of numbers must overcome. That is, any set of definitions that 
are plagued by these difficulties are inadequate. And, according to Frege, 
only the substantival strategy could possibly provide us with definitions that 
avoid these difficulties. 
Evidence for my reading of this section is provided in the last sentence 
of §56. According to Frege, with the definitions provided in the previous 
5 Gottlob Frege, op.cit., page x. This would be an odd criticism to raise against 
definitions that, on Dummett's reading, purport to do no more. 
6 Ibid, page x. 
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section "we have no authority to pick out 0 and 1 here as self-subsistent 
objects that can be recognized as the same again." 7 Clearly, if Frege's 
intention is to show that the definitions provided by the adjectival strategy 
are inadequate, he would not have raised this criticism. Hence, what I am 
suggesting is that by §56 Frege is already determined to defend the 
substantival account of number statements. He is not trying to prove that 
the definitions of the adjectival strategy are problematic, as Dummett 
suggests. 
Why then did he propose the definitions in the previous section? 
These, I believe, were proposed strictly for rhetorical purposes. These 
definitions bring to our attention the sorts of qualities adequate definitions 
of the numbers must have. Hence, by proposing these definitions, Frege can 
present the substantival strategy as necessary. That is, Frege is not 
suggesting that we choose between two competing accounts of number 
statements, as Dummett suggests. Rather, at this point in the Grundlagen, 
Frege is convinced that numbers are objects and presents the alternative 
definitions in order for his reader to see that only if numbers are objects can 
we possibly make sense of number statements. 
Frege's discussion in §57 offers additional support for my reading. He 
begins the section arguing that the definitions of §55 treat numbers as 
predicates. 8 Clearly, if Frege were trying to argue that the adjectival view is 
untenable he would not have raised this as an objection; this really would 
beg the question. Rather, this complaint is only sensible if he is already 
presupposing that numbers are objects. 
Further, in this same section, Frege contrasts "a concept of number 
usable for purposes of science" with "the language of everyday life [in 
which] numbers appear also in attributive constructions." 9 Our concern, 
Frege argues, is with the former, not the latter. ' 0 At this point Frege cannot 
possibly be trying to refute the adjectival view, a view which maintains that 
all number statements can be recast in attributive constructions, and that 
such constructions better reflect the ontology of numbers. The content of 
§57 clearly suggests that Frege has already settled on the substantival 
strategy. 
Consequently, contrary to what Dummett suggests, Frege is not trying 
to argue that the substantival view is better than the adjectival view. Rather, 
his claim is that a particular set of definitions—those presented in §55—are 
inadequate because they fail to meet our expectations of definitions of 
numbers. And these expectations can only be satisfied if we assume that 
numbers are objects. 
7 Ibid, page 68. 
8 Ibid, page 68. 
' Ibid, page 69. 
>° Ibid, page 69. 
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SECTION IV Reassessing Dummett's Criticisms 
In this section, I will assess the relevance of Dummett's criticisms raised in 
section II of this paper to this alternative reading of §56. 
First, consider Dummett's criticism that Frege begs the question. Given 
that Frege is arguing that the substantival view is the only view that can 
provide us with acceptable definitions of numbers and that he proposes the 
adjectival definitions merely for rhetorical purposes, Frege cannot be 
accused of begging the question. Dummett is correct to say that Frege 
presupposes in §56 that numbers are objects, but this does not beg the 
question, for Dummett is mistaken about what Frege is trying to do in this 
section. The question Dummett takes to be Frege's question is not, in fact, 
Frege's question. As I suggested in the previous section, Frege's intention is 
not to show that the adjectival strategy won't do. Rather, his intention is to 
show that the substantival view is correct because it avoids the sorts of 
short-comings that are characteristic of the definitions provided in §55. The 
definitions are proposed in order to show us what acceptable definitions of 
numbers must do. 
Second, consider Dummett's complaint that Frege's criticisms in §56 
only address the third definition. Given my proposed reading of §56, the 
criticisms raised in this section are not directed toward any particular 
definition. Rather, the criticisms are intended to show that numbers must be 
self-subsistent objects. Further, the last sentence of §56 which I discussed 
in some detail earlier is explicitly about the definitions of 0 and 1. 
Consequently, given my reading of §56, this criticism is not relevant. 
Consider Dummett's third criticism, that Frege regards the adjectival 
view as a disguised version of the substantival view. Clearly, on the reading 
I have proposed, Frege is not claiming that the definitions proposed in §55 
implicitly assume that numbers are objects. Rather, Frege's claim is that 
these definitions make it apparent to us that numbers must be objects. After 
all, unless they are objects we cannot make sense of number statements. 
Consequently, this criticism is also irrelevant. 
Dummett's final criticism is the one that I believe to be the most 
detrimental to my proposed reading of §56. Recall that this criticism states 
that Frege has failed to prove that numbers are in fact objects. I am inclined 
to agree with Dummett. One is left with the impression that Frege has not 
actually proved that numbers are objects. Insofar as Frege has provided us 
with a proof, it is of the transcendental sort. Frege's argument in §56 seems 
to be as follows: unless numbers are objects, we would neither (1) be able to 
distinguish numbers from non-numbers, nor (2) be able to identify a number 
with itself over time; but, we can both distinguish numbers from non-
numbers and identify a number with itself over time; therefore, numbers 
must be objects. I believe it is questionable whether numbers must be 
objects in order to distinguish numbers from non-numbers, and to identify a 
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number with itself over time. Consequently, Dummett's final criticism is 
still a concern on my reading of §56. 
At the end of §61 Frege gives a clearer indication of what he thinks his 
thesis entails. He claims that "it is a fact that the number 4 is exactly the 
same for everyone who deals with i t . " 1 1 If this is what Frege means when 
he claims that numbers are objects, one can still wonder, with Dummett, 
whether the adjectival strategy cannot also accommodate this fact—that 
each number is exactly the same for everyone who deals with i t . 1 2 You will 
recall that Dummett believes that in order to show that numbers are objects 
Frege must show that the definitions of the adjectival strategy are logically 
amiss. It is questionable whether Frege has accomplished this. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper I have tried to defend an alternative reading of §56 of Frege's 
Grundlagen, one that rescues Frege from Dummett's charge that this section 
is the weakest in the whole book. On my reading, Frege is not presenting 
arguments against the adjectival strategy. Rather, Frege presents the 
definitions in §55 in order to convince his reader that numbers must be 
objects. In §56 Frege suggests that these definitions contain two short-
comings that adequate definitions of numbers must overcome. And these 
short-comings, he argues, can only be avoided if numbers are objects. 
Further, I have argued that my alternative reading defuses three of 
Dummett's four criticisms of §56, consequently challenging Dummett's 
claim that this section should be stigmatized as the weakest in the whole 
book. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Dummett that the adjectival 
strategy is more robust than Frege suggests. Frege's arguments seem far 
from conclusive. Thus, it may be that the adjectival strategy can provide us 
with definitions that can do everything we can expect from adequate 
definitions of numbers. 13 
1 1 Ibid, page 72. 
1 2 Obviously Frege must have more in mind when he claims that numbers are 
objects, for, unless numbers are objects in some stronger sense, Frege's proof for the 
infinity of numbers cannot work. 
1 3 This paper benefitted greatly from helpful comments from Lori Nash, William 
Demopoulos, and an anonymous referee for Auslegung. 1 would also like to thank 
the University of Western Ontario for a Graduate Research Fellowship which 
relieved me of my teaching duties for the 1994-95 year, which made preparing the 
manuscript for publication easier than it would have been otherwise. 
